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ABSTRACT
Over the past 20 years, there has been a dramatic increase in the share of executive compensation
paid through stock options. In this paper, we examine the extent to which tax policy has influenced
the composition of executive compensation, and discuss the implications of rising stock-based pay
for tax policy. We begin by describing the tax rules for executive pay in detail and analyzing how
changes in various tax rates affect the tax advantages of stock options relative to salary and bonus.
Our empirical analysis leads to three conclusions. First, there is little evidence that tax changes have played
a major role in the dramatic explosion in executive stock option pay since 1980. Although the tax advantage
of options has approximately doubled since the early 1980s, options currently have only a slight tax advantage
relative to cash -approximately$4 per $100 of pre-tax compensation to the executive. A more convincing
story for the dramatic explosion in stock options involves changes in corporate governance and the market for
corporate control. For example, there is a strong correlation between the fraction of shares held by large
institutional investors and the fraction of executive pay in the form of stock options, a result that holds both
longitudinally and cross-sectionally. Second, we find evidence that the million dollar rule (which limited the
corporate deductibility of non-performance-related executive compensation to $1 million) led firms to adjust
the composition of their pay away from salary and toward "performance related pay," although our estimates
suggest that substitution was minor. We find no evidence that the regulation decreased the level of total
compensation. Third, we examine whether there is evidence for significant shifting of the timing of option
exercises in response to changes in tax rates. After replicating the Goolsbee (1999) result regarding tax-
shifting with our data for the 1993 tax reform, we show that no such shifting occurred in either of the two tax
reforms of the 1980s. Moreover, we find evidence that much of the unusually large level of option exercises
in 1992 was the result of the rising stock market rather than the change in marginal tax rates.
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Over the past 15 years, there has been a major change in the way that American
executives, particularly CEOs, are paid. For many executives, annual stock option grants are
now greater than cash compensation (salary and bonus). Annual changes in CEO wealth from
revaluations of stock and stock option holdings completely swamp cash compensation, and
provide substantial pay-to-performance sensitivity. All of this is a dramatic change from the
early 1980s when the median stock option grant to top executives was zero.
In this paper, we examine the extent to which tax policy has influenced the composition
of executive compensation, and discuss the implications of rising stock-based pay for tax policy.
Because top executives manage assets worth billions of dollars, their compensation arrangements
and the incentives they face are of substantial importance to the performance of the U.S.
economy. Because top executives have very high incomes, their responsiveness to taxation has
important revenue and efficiency implications.
We conduct a broad analysis of the taxation of executives. We begin by studying how tax
rates affect the degree to which options are favored relative to cash and how the tax advantage of
options has changed over time in response to changes in corporate, personal, and capital gains
tax rates. Although the tax advantage of options has approximately doubled since the early
1980s, options currently have only a slight tax advantage relative to cash —approximately$4 per
$100 of pre-tax compensation.
We then analyze what we believe to be the three central policy questions regarding the
taxation of executive pay. First, we examine the extent to which the stock option explosion has
been influenced by the many changes in tax rates over the past 20 years. The evidence suggests
that changes in taxation have likely had a very modest influence on the option explosion.
Instead, changes in corporate governance, especially in the role of large institutional investors,
appear to have provided the main impetus for the increase in stock-based pay.
Second, we examine the effectiveness of tax policies aimed at curbing what is deemed by
some to be excessive levels of executive compensation. Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue
Code (the "million dollar rule") was enacted in 1993, which put a $1 million limit on the
deductibility (against corporate profits) of non-performance related executive pay. Although we
find evidence that this rule led to a shift in the composition of pay —awayfrom salary and
toward more performance-related bonuses and stock options —ourevidence suggests that the
1magnitude of this substitution wassmall: We find no evidence that the million dollar rule
decreased total executive compensation.
Third, we analyze the degree to which the tax code is efficient in raising tax revenue from top
executives. The stock option explosion has led to a new and important way for executives to
lowdttheir taxes in response to changes in tax rates: by timing their stock option gains. For
example, in 1993, it was widely reported in the press that well-known CEOs such as Disney's
Michael Eisner pushed their option gains into 1992 in order to avoid paying the higher personal
income tax rates implemented in 1993. In an important paper, Goolsbee (1999) argues that the
tax shifting between 1992 and 1993 was enormous, and the direct result of the increase in
marginal tax rates during this period. After replicating Goolsbee's evidence regarding tax-
shifting with our data for the 1993 tax reform, we show that no such shifting occurred in
response to either of the two tax reforms of the 1 980s. Moreover, our evidence indicates that the
stock market run-up in 1991 and 1992 was more import than the change in marginal tax rates in
causing the large option gains observed in 1992.
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss trends in the level and
performance sensitivity of executive compensation. In section three, we describe the tax and
accounting rules concerning executive compensation. In section four, we analyze how taxes
affect the degree to which options are favored relative to cash. In section five, we examine how
the tax advantage of options has changed over time. In section six, we provide evidence on the
effect of taxation on the composition of executive compensation. Section seven contains
empirical analysis of the million dollar rule. Section eight contains evidence on tax shifting and
option gains. Section nine concludes.
2. Trends in To.p Executive Pay
In this section, we document how top executive pay has changed over time, and discuss how
this change has caused the sensitivity of CEO wealth to firm market value to increase
substantially. There has been a large increase in the level of CEO pay since 1980 and this
growth has been driven by the dramatic increase in stock option grants during this time (Hall and
Liebman, 1998). Although salary and bonuses nearly doubled over the period in inflation
adjusted terms, the mean value of stock option grants increased by 683 percent. The percentage
increase in the median stock option award can not be calculated because the median stock option
2grant was zero in 1980. The median CEO did not receive anannual stock option grant until
1985. Today, nearly all top executives of large companies receive stock options and the average
stock option grant is now larger for most top executives than salary and bonus combined.
The (inflation adjusted) growth rate of CEO pay since 1980 --measurednarrowly (cash pay
grew at an annual rate of 5percentper year) or broadly (cash plus option grants grew atalmost 9
percent per year) or very broadly (total compensation, includingstock and stock option
appreciation, grew at 11.5 percent per year) --has been large relative to virtuallyall other
groups. Indeed, the growth rate of CEO paysince 1980 has been high even relative to the pay
increases of other high-income earners. For example, the cutoff point for being in the top0.5
percent of adjusted gross income (AGI) increased by about3.7 percent per year, about half the
rate for direct CEO compensation (excluding stock and option appreciation).The only workers
who appear to have had faster compensation growth than CEOs are other "superstars." The
annual pay of professional baseball players increased by approximately 9.8 percent per year,
while that of professional basketball players rose by 13.9 percent per year.
The increase in. stock options has led to a large increase in the equity holdings of top
executives, and this in turn has led to a dramatic increase in the responsiveness of executive
wealth to firm performance. Nearly all of the pay-to-performance sensitivity of executive
compensation comes from equity holdings; for a given increase in shareholder value, changesin
the value of an executives stock and stock options are more than 50 times larger than changes in
salary and bonus (flail and Liebman, 1998).
As a concrete example, the estimates in Hall and Liebman (1998) imply that a 10 percent
increase in firm value (of the median company in our sample) leads the company to increase the
CEO's salary and bonus by about $25,000. However, this same 10 percent increase in
shareholder value translates into $1.25 million increase in the value of the CEO's stock and stock
option holdings.1
The dramatic rise in the link between CEO wealth and firm performance can be seen in
figure 1, which shows how two measures of this link have increasedsince 1980.2 The first
1 Stock option grants are also very sensitive to changes in firm performance, mostly because many grants are
multi-yearplans that hold the yearly number of options constant, and the same number ofat-the money options are
worth more when the stock price is higher and vice-versa. If stock option grant sensitivity is also included,then
about 91 percent of pay-to-performance sensitivity comes from stock and stock option revaluations, 7 percent comes
from stock option grant changes, and less than 2 percent comes from changes in salary and bonus. (Hall, 1999).
2 Both measures include only the link created by CEO holdings of stock and stock options,and ignore the smaller
3measure, the Jensen and Murphy (1990) sharing rate (shown onthe left scale), is the change in
CEO wealth for a $1,000 change in firm value. The second measure is the change in CEO
wealth for a 10 percent change in firm value (see Baker and Hall, 1998). Since both measures
are strongly affected by firm size (the former has a negativecorrelation and the latter has a
positiv&dorrelation), the pay-to-performance changes over time are estimatedwith regression
(quantile) analysis that controls for changes in the distribution of firmsizes sample over time.
The figure, therefore, shows the increase in the pay-to-performance measures over timefor a
constant size firm, in this case a $1 billion firm (in constant 1998 dollars). The strikingfact is
that both measures of the pay-to-performance link have increased by nearly a factorof 10 since
1980. These pay-to-performance increases are even larger than those we reported in ourearlier
paper that analyzed the period 1980 to 1994 becauseof the large increase in stock option grants
combined with the strong stock market performance in the 1994 to 1998 period.
3. Tax and Accounting Rules
Stock options give an executive the right but not the obligation to buy a share of the
company's stock at a pre-specified price —the"exercise" or "strike" price." Typically, options
can not be exercised immediately. That is, they vest (become owned bythe executive, who can
then exercise if he or she wishes) slowly over time. Common vesting periods are in the three- to
five-year range, and options usually vest linearly (e.g. a four year option vestsat 25 percent at
the end of each year). An executive typically loses any unvested options upon departure.
Although options may be exercised as soon as they vest, they do not have to beexercised until
they expire or mature. Almost 85 percent of stock option plans have a termof exactly ten years,
with virtually all of the remainder being in the five to ten year range. About 95 percent of
options are granted "at the money" or at "fair market value," which meansthat the exercise price
at grant date is set equal to the stock price at grant date. The remaining 5 percent areeither
"discount" options (so called "in the money" options, where the exercise price is below the stock
price at grant date) or "premium" options (so called "out of the money" options,where the
exercise price is above the stock price at grant date). The holders of options typicallydo not
have dividend rights or voting rights, even on vested options.3
amount of pay-to-performance sensitivity that operates through changes in salary,bonus and stock option grants.
3 See Murphy (1999) for details about stock options, and Miller and Scholes (1982) on taxincentives.
43.1 Tax Rules and Stock Option Compensation
Unlike salary and bonus, stock option grants are typically an untaxed event at the time of
grant. For the most widely used options —Non-QualifiedStock Options (NQSOs) —executives
are taxed at the personal income tax rate on option profits (the difference between that stock
price and the exercise price times the number of options) when the options are exercised. The
company receives a parallel deduction against corporate income at that point. If the executive
continues to hold the shares after exercise, any subsequent appreciation is taxed at the capital
gains rate in the usual way. In 1993, an additional feature was added to the tax code (Internal
Revenue Code Section 162(M) that disallowed a corporate deduction for any executive pay
above $1 million that is not "performance based." While this rule affects executive salaries,
most bonuses qualify as performance based and standard stock options automatically qualify.
Therefore, this provision gives companies with highly paid executives an incentive to give more
pay in the form of bonuses and stock options, a subject we return to in section 7. A summary
description of the tax (and accounting) treatment of cash and option compensation is in Table I.
A far less common type of option, which is estimated to account for about 5 percent of option
grants, is the Incentive Stock Option (ISO). While ISOs are similar to NQSOs in terms of their
design, they are crucially different in two respects. First, they have an annual cap of $100,000
per executive. Second, the tax treatment of ISOs is different. ISOs are completely untaxed at
grant or exercise. It is only at sale that the executive is taxed, and even then the executive is
taxed at the lower capital gains tax rate. The disadvantage is that the corporation never gets to
take a parallel tax deduction against corporate profits. Thus, ISOs become more attractive as the
personal tax rate increases and as the corporate tax rate and the capital gains tax rates fall.
Two other related types of compensation, restricted stock and stock appreciation rights
are worth brief discussion. Both, however, are far less common than standard stock options.
Restricted stock is payment in the form of restricted shares, the restriction being that the shares
vest over time as with options. Unlike options, the shares typically have voting and dividend
rights. With regard to taxation, the executive is taxed at the personal rate on the value of the
restricted stock as the vesting restrictions lapse. However, the executive may choose to be taxed
at the grant date, in which case all subsequent appreciation is taxed at the capital gains rate. The
dividends paid to the executive are taxed at the ordinary rate in the usual way. The company
5generally receives a parallel deduction equal to the amount of the executive's income when the
executive is taxed. Unlike stock options, restricted stock is not generally considered to be
"performance based" and is therefore subject to the million dollar rule (unless the vesting of the
restricted stock is performance based, which is sometimes the case).
Stock' appreciation rights (SARs) are rights that replicate the payoffs of stock options
with a cash transfer. Thus, SARs are simpler than options in that there is no requirement to buy
and resell the stock in order to "cash out," SARs generally have the same tax treatment as
NQSOs, both to the individual and to the corporation. SARs are relatively rare, however,
because they have disadvantageous accounting treatment (described in the next section) relative
to stock options, and their main relative advantage vis-à-vis options has been essentially
replicated through broker-assisted cashless option exercises —wherebya broker makes a
"nanosecond" loan to the executive (to purchase and resell the stock) when the executive wants
to "cash in" on option profits. The tax and accounting treatment of ISOs, restricted stock and
SARs is summarized in Table 2.
3.2The Accounting Treatment of Options
Unlike cash compensation, which is expensed against earnings, there is generally no
expense recognition (at grant, exercise, or sale) for options, whether they be NQSOs or ISOs. As
a result, compensation consultants often point out that stock options are the only form of
compensation that are free in an accounting sense, but still deductible for tax purposes. Stock
options do, however, lead to expense recognition if they are "discounted" ("in the money" at
grant date) or if the exercise price and number of options are not known at grant date. For
discount options, the difference between the stock price and the market price is expensed over
the vesting period. For options with variable terms (e.g. a variable exercise price, vesting that is
tied to performance), the options are marked to market and expensed during the time between
grant and exercise. Practitioners claim that the accounting treatment of options plays an
important role in the design of option program. Thus, plans that have "bad accounting" but are
thought by many to have attractive incentive features, are often not even seriously considered by
companies. Examples of such potentially attractive plans include indexed options (where a CEO
profits only if his finn's share price grows relative to some market or industry benchmark) and
option grants that are explicitly performance related, both of which would lead to expenses
against earnings.
6Unlike options, restricted stock and SARS do not generally receive favorable accounting
treatment. Restricted stock is generally expensed over the period in which the restrictions lapse
(usually the vesting period). The magnitude of the expense is the difference between the current
stock price and the executive's cost (if any). SARs are marked to market each period and the
difference between the stock price and the exercise price is expensed over the outstandingperiod
of SARs.
4. The Taxation of Executive Pay: Cash versus Options
Stock-based compensation performs two roles in executive compensation arrangements.
First, it helps align the incentives of the executive with the interests of the firm's shareholders.
Second, it often enables the firm to compensate the CEO in a way that is more advantageous
from a tax standpoint than paying the executive in salary and bonus.
4.1 Agency Theory and Executive Compensation in the Presence of Taxation
In standard agency theory models (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), agency costs are the result of
the separation of ownership and control. Managers do not have the same incentives as the
owners. The optimal incentive contract for managers balances the benefits of high-powered
incentives (linking the fortunes of owners and managers through stock and stock options for
example) with the costs of loading too much risk on risk-averse managers.
The effect of taxation on the optimal contract (more precisely the share of compensation that
is performance related) is ambiguous (even in the absence of deductibility and deferral) because
there are offsetting effects. First, by reducing the share of corporate profits received by
shareholders, taxes diminish the importance to the shareholders of motivating the CEO. Taken
alone, this effect would imply that taxes would be expected to reduce the use of performance-
based compensation. Second, because the government shares in the income received by the
CEO, the variance of the CEO's income is reduced, raising his utility, and lowering the cost to
the firm of providing any given set of incentives. Third, because taxes will lead executives to
provide less effort for any given level of incentive based pay, the level of compensation that
must be provided to compensate the CEO for effort is reduced, for a given amount of incentive.
These last two factors make it cheaper for the firm to offer contracts to the CEO with large
incentive components when tax rates are higher, and should therefore increase the use of
incentive based pay. Since the net impact of taxation on the level of incentive-based pay is
7ambiguous, agency theory provides no strong predictions about how taxation should affect the
optimal composition of option versus cash compensation.
4.2The Tax Advantages of Deferral
While agency theory yields ambiguous predictions about the impact of taxes on the use of
options, therdare direct tax advantages of options since options provide executives with a way to
defer compensation and thereby lower their taxes. However, because options also lead to a
deferral of corporate tax deductibility, the tax advantages from a combined (executive and
corporate) perspective are not so straightforward. In this section, we analyze and measure the
tax advantages of stock options relative to salary and bonus compensation. We also analyze the
tax advantages of NQSOs relative to ISOs. In particular, we show how the tax advantages of
options change as personal, corporate and capital gains taxes change. We then show how the tax
advantages of options have changed over time in response to changing tax rates.
The crucial tax difference between standard options (NQSOs) and cash payment is that
option payouts are deferred, and the two forms of compensation earn different rates of return
over the deferral period. Any analysis of the relative tax advantages of two compensation
instruments must consider the tax consequences both to the employer and to the employee —
whatScholes and Wolfson (1992) call the global contracting perspective. Thus, in order to make
valid comparisons between the two, we compare the tax burden to the executive, while holding
constant the post-tax cost to the company. By keeping post-tax employer costs (in NPV terms)
constant, any package that is preferred by the employee is tax advantaged in the global
contracting sense.
Under this methodology, a comparison of the tax advantages of options and cash involves
comparing a pre-tax cash payment of P with an option payment that has the equivalent post tax
NPV to the company. For NQSOs, it is straightforward to show that a pie-tax payment of P to
an executive has exactly the same cost to the company as putting aside P for the purposes of
paying stock option payouts later. That is, if a company pays an executive P today, it will have
the same amount of money in N years as if it had put aside P today, let it accumulate at the rate
of return earned by the firm, and then paid it out (as compensation in the form of option gains4)
with any appreciation in year N.
4 This analysis is not unique to options. Any form of deferred compensation that enables executives to invest inside
the firm at a higher post-tax return or without paying capital gains taxes would have similar effects.
8Assume that the pre-tax profit rate is r, and the corporate tax rate is Tc. Then, if the
company pays P today, it receives a deduction today of P Tc, which yields
(1) PT[l +r(1_Tc)]N
in N years, since the benefits of the tax deduction are invested in thecompany and receive the
after-tax corporate rate of return. Conversely, if thecompany puts P aside today, then it grows at
the after-tax corporate rate of return in N years to give a tax deduction of
(2) P[l +r(ITc)INTc
which is the exact same value. Note that the equivalence of these two tax deductions is
analogous to the tax-benefit equivalence of front-loaded and back-loaded IRAs.
An executive's payoff in N years from option profits is equal to P compounded at the
after-tax corporate rate times 1 —T,where T is the personal tax rate. Thus, the combined
payoffs in N years of the corporate deduction and the executive's post-tax payoff is:
(3) P[1+rUTc)]NT +P[l+r(1Tj]N(1_Tp)
where the first term is the payoff from the corporate deduction and the second term is the
executive's payoff.
The payoff to salary and bonus in N years is more complicated sincean assumption must
be made about how the executive invests the original cash compensation. Forexample, if the
executive invests in an instrument with taxable interest (e.g. bonds), then the Nyear payoff from
an investment of P accumulates at the post-corporate-tax, post-personal-tax rate of return and is:
(4)P(1 —Tn) [1 +r(1 —T)(l—T)] N
However,if an executive invests in (non-dividend paying) equities, the investment accumulates
at the higher post-corporate-tax rate of return, with the offsetting disadvantage that thecapital
gains are taxed at the capital-gains rate in year N. So the executive receives
9(5)p [1 +r(1—Tc)]N(1Tp)Tcg[P(1-T) [1 +r(1_Tc)}N_P(1_Tp)]
whereTcg is the capital gains tax rate.5
Thus, putting the equations together, if an executive is paid cash, P, and investsyin bonds and 1-
yin equities, the N year payoff (including the payoff to the corporation from thetax deduction)
is:
(6) P[1 +r(1-Tc)fTc+ y{P[1 +r(1 T)(1T)]N(l —T)} +
(1-y){P[1 +r(l-Tc)] N(1Tp)Tcg [PUT) [1 +r(1T)]p (hT)]}
The tax advantage of options versus salary and bonus, therefore, is thedifference between the
combined (corporate and executive) payoffs in equation (3) and the combinedpayoffs in
equation (6).
4.3The Tax Advantage of Options
We now turn to analysis of how changes in various tax rates affect thetax advantages of
options relative to cash compensation. We focus on the case in which the cash earnedby
executives is invested entirely in equities since equities are tax-favoredrelative to bonds. The
important conclusions of this analysis are not substantively different ifwe instead assume that a
portion of an executive's holdings are invested in bonds.
4.3.1 The TaxAdvantageof Options: Changing the Corporate Tax Rate
Stock options are tax advantaged relative to cash simply becauseoption payouts arc
deferred, allowing the executive to invest at the pre-personal tax rate of return(with no capital
gains tax at the end) rather than investing at the after-tax rate of return orpaying the capital gains
tax. Since the advantage of being able to defer taxes is large when thecorporate tax rate is low,
the tax advantage of options is larger when thecorporate rate is low.
5Inpractice, executives hold a combination of equities and bond-like instruments with taxable interest. Because
equities are tax favored, in the next section we simplify the analysis by assuming that executives hold
only equities.
Alternatively, we could have assumed that executives hold only less risky bonds since bondsmore closely match the
risk profile of a stream of tax savings. None of our empirical results aresubstantively affected by this
simplification.
10To illustrate this point, we define the taxadvantage of options to be the dollar amount by
which total after-tax option payoffs (to thecorporation and the executive) exceed the total
payoffs from salary, as defined by the difference of equations(3) and (6) assuming that P (the
payment to the executive), is equal to $100 and yequals 0 (cashcompensation is invested in
equities). We use a ten-year horizon since most options havea ten-year term. We then cIculate
how the tax advantage of options changes as thecorporate tax rate varies from zero to 100
percent, holding the personal tax rate and the capital gains rate fixed at 40percent and 20 percent
respectively (which approximates current rates).
The top panel of Figure 2 shows the tax advantage ofoptions relative to cash —precisely,
the NPV of the total tax advantage of options fora $100 payment to the CEO —asthe corporate
tax rate changes. As expected, the tax advantage ofoptions declines as corporate tax rates
increase. At a zero corporate tax rate, the taxadvantage of options has an NPV of $7. This
value is about $3.5 at a corporate rate of 40percent. When the corporate tax rate is 100 percent,
the tax advantage of options completely disappears since thebenefits of deferred compensation
fall to zero since the after-tax return on equities(and therefore the discount rate) falls to zero.
The tax advantage of options is the NPV of the taxsavings from avoiding the capital gains tax on
ten years of appreciation, which is why it is relatively modesteven at the 40 percent corporate
rate.
4.3.2 The Tax Advantage of Options:Changing the Personal Tax Rate
Using the same assumptions as above (but this timeholding the corporate rate at 40
percent, the capital gains rate at 20 percent and varying the personalrate), the tax advantage of
options declines as personal tax rates rises, as shown in the middlepanel of Figure 2. The tax
advantage of options is higher at low personal tax rates because thepost-tax base that gives rise
to capital gains is higher and the advantage of avoiding thecapital gains taxes is greater. The tax
advantage of options therefore declines linearly as the personal tax rate rises.At a 100 percent
personal tax rate, the executive receives nothing in eithercase, and by construction, the
company's tax deduction benefit is the same in NPV terms, so the taxadvantage of options falls
to zero also.6
6 This is one place where ignoring bond investments has substantiveimplications. In particular, in the all-bond
case the tax advantage of options is nonmonotonic —.itrises and then falls --aspersonal tax rates rise.
114.3.3 The Tax Advantage of Options: Changing the Capital Gains Tax Rate
The tax advantage of options for various capital gains rates is depicted in the bottom
panel of Figure 2 under the same assumptions (this time holding both the personal rate and the
corporate rate at 40 percent, while varying the capital gains rate). The tax advantage of avoiding
the capital gains tax increases as the capital gains tax rate rises.
5. How has the Tax Advantage of Options Changed over Time?
The analysis so far has illustrated how the tax advantage of options varies with the
changes in tax rates. In this section, we show how the tax advantage of options has changed over
time as tax rates have changed.
5.1Top Marginal Tax Rates Over Time
The evolution of the top marginal tax rates --personal,corporate and capital gains --from
1980 to 1998 is shown in Figure 3. In all cases, the top rate (the rate for taxpayers with the
highest incomes) is shown, which is not always the highest rate since various anomalies (such as
clawbacks of exemptions) sometimes lead to marginal tax rates that are higher than those for the
highest income taxpayers.
The top personal tax rate was 70 percent in 1980, faIling to 50 percent in 1982 and 28
percent in 1988 following the 1986 tax act. The top marginal tax rate has since risen to 39.6
percent, but is effectively 42.5 percent since there is a 2.9 percent Medicare surcharge (paid half
by theemployer and half by the employee) that has no upper limit. The top corporate tax rate
has had only one significant change since 1980, falling from 46 percent before the 1986 tax act
to 34 percent following the act in 1988. The top corporate tax rate was increased to 35 percent in
1993. The top capital gains rate has fluctuated between 28 percent (approximately) and 20
percent since 1980, and is currently at 20 percent.
5.2The Evolution of the Tax Advantage of NQSOs
The tax advantage of options relative to cash, defined in the same way as in section 4,
from 1980 to 1998 is shown in Figure 4. The calculations are done using the same assumptions
as before (i.e. N is ten years and cash is invested in equities) and the statutory top marginal tax
rates shown in Figure 3 are used. Due to the fall in corporate and personal tax rates, the tax
7 During the early 1980s, ihe maximum tax on earned income limited the marginal tax rate on the earnings of high
earners, so many executives did not face a decline in personal tax rates between 1981 and 1982. The empirical
12advantage of options increased sharply after the Tax Reform Act of 1986. This increasein tax
advantage has largely been reversed in the 1990s as top personal tax rates havecrept back up and
the capital gains rate has been reduced.
Two key facts emerge from this analysis. First, there iscurrently only a moderate tax
advantage to standard non-qualified stock options —onthe order of $4 per $100 of compensation:
This is because the tax advantages to the executive ofdeferring taxes are largely offset by the tax
disadvantages to the company of not being able to deduct optionexpenses from taxable profits
until the executive exercises the options. Second,although the 1986 tax act substantially
increased the tax advantage of options, more than half of this increasehas been reversed in the
1990s.
5.3The Tax(Dis)Advantage of ISOs
So far the analysis has focused on the tax advantages ofNQSOs since they are so much
more prevalent than ISOs, which account for only about 5percentof option grants. The relative
scarcity of ISOs can be explained both by their tax status and by theirper executive cap of
$100,000 per year.
Under what conditions are ISOs tax preferred to NQSOs? Fora transfer P to an
executive, the ISO is always tax preferred by the executive (since thecapital gains rate is lower
than the personal rate) while the NQSO is always taxpreferred from the company's perspective
(since an ISO is not deductible). The key issue, however, is the relativeadvantages of the two
types of options from a global contracting perspective. Because ISOs are notdeductible, the
company is indifferent between setting aside Pin the form of NQSOs today and setting asdie P
(1 -T)in the form of IS Os. (Since the NPV of the tax deduction forNQSOs is P T, the NPV of
thePpaymentis P—PTorP(l-T))
Equalizing the post-tax cost of NQSOs and ISOs, we need only look at thepayoff of the
executive to determine the condition under which each ispreferred. The payoff of NQSOs in N
years is:
(7) P [1 +r(l—T3] (l—T)
The same payoff for ISOs is:
results in this paper are robust to assuming that executives faced a marginal tax rate of 50percent in 1980 and 1981.
13(8) P (1 —T)[1 + r (hTj] N(lTcg)
IS Os, therefore, are tax advantaged if:
(9) TpTcg> TcTcTcg
Intuitively, ISOs are tax advantaged only if their advantage(the difference between the
personal rate and the capital gains rate) is large enough to offset theircost (the disadvantage of
not deducting at the corporate rate). Note, however, that thecondition is not a simple
comparison between the corporate rate the personal rate minus thecapital gains rate (T -
Ta).
Figure 5showshow the tax advantage of NQSOs relative toISOs, has changed since
1980 as tax rates have changed. Unlike thevery modest changes (around 3 to 4 percent) in the
relative tax advantages between options and cash shownin Figure 4, the relative tax advantage
between NQSOs and ISOs has seen enormousswings. When the top personal rate was 70
percent in 1980, ISOs were tax-favored by a margin ofgreater than 6 percent. However, by 1982
(following the 1981 tax acts that dramatically lowered thepersonal tax rate), ISOs became tax-
disadvantaged by about 5 percent. By 1988 (following the 1986tax act), ISOs became tax-
disadvantaged by about 18 percent, a dramatic swing. Theraising of personal rates coupled
with a decrease in the capital gains rate has since reducedthe tax disadvantage of ISOs to about
$4 per $100 of pre-tax compensation. Although hard dataon ISOs are hard to come by,
practitioners (mostly compensation consultants) claim that ISOswere more popular prior to 1982
when they were tax advantaged. Although ISOsare less disadvantageous from a tax standpoint
relative to NQSOs than they were in the late 1980s,they are still disadvantageous, so it is not
surprising that they have not made a significantresurgence in recent years.
6. Explaining the Increase in Option-based Compensation
In this section, we analyze whether changes in taxrates affect the composition of
executive compensation, and consider the relativeimportance of tax factors and corporate
governance factors in explaining the increasing share of compensation paid in the formof stock
14options. The numerous changes in tax rates that have occurredsince 1980provide an
opportunity to assess whether executive compensationarrangements respond to tax incentives in
the way that the tax avoidance modelsuggests. We test this model using a panel data set of
CEOs in large publicly-traded U.S. corporations. Our identificationof the tax effects relies on
time-series variation in personal, corporate, andcapital gains tax rates along with cross-sectional
variation in corporate tax rates.
6.1Data
We use a 15-year panel data set of CEOs in thelargest publicly-traded U.S. corporations,
which is described in Hall and Liebman (1998). The dataset covers the years from 1980 through
1994, and combines CEO compensation information fromcorporate proxies and 10-K filings
with stock price and stock return information fromCRSP, and accounting data from Compustat,
In addition, some compensation data from the l970swere collected in order to construct
measures of the value of stock options held by the CEOs in the firstperiod of the sample.8
The feature that distinguishes our data from most other CEOdata sets is that with our
panel of yearly proxy data on option grants, option gains, and totaloptions held, we are able to
calculate the total value of all stock options heldby the CEO at a point of time. More
importantly, since we have the details about the stock options held(number, exercise price, time
to maturity, etc.), we can precisely calculate the change in thevalue of a CEO's stock option
holdings for a given change in firm value.
6.2Identification Issues
The numerous tax changes over our sampleperiod and the specific ways in which
changes in personal, corporate, and capital gains rates arepredicted to affect the composition of
CEO compensation give us unusually rich sources of identification.However, because many of
the changes in tax rates would be expected to affect all of theCEOs in our sample in a similar
way, we will need to pay particular attention to separating out the tax effects fromunderlying
time-trends and other factors that changed over time.Controlling for underlying trends is
particularly important in this study because we are focusing on anoutcome --theuse of stock
options —thathas increased rapidly over the past two decades, and thatmany practitioners
We are grateful to David Yermack for providing us withsome of the data for the 1984 to 1991 period
See Yermack [1995] for a discussion of these data.
15believe was importantly affected by non-tax considerations. Thus the tax effects weare trying to
explain are deviations from a rising trend.
We take two steps to try to separate out the tax effects from the underlying trend. First,
we include key non-tax factors that could potentially explain the increasing reliance on
performance-based compensation. It has been suggested that the dramatic increase in incentive-
based pay is the result of the remarkably poor shareholder returns during the 1970s, which
spurred the LBO and takeover movements of the 1980's. According to this story (Kaplan, 1997),
shareholders became much more powerful via the rise of institutional investors, even as the LBO
and takeover movements waned. Because the influence of institutional investors is thought to be
one of the most important mechanisms of strong corporate governance, we use the share of each
company's stock owned by institutional investors (defined as institutions with more than $100
million under management) as an explanatory variable.9 Thepercentage of shares owned by
large institutional investors increased from about 20 percent to almost 50 percent in 1994, an
upward trend that closely matches the sharp rise in the share of compensation in the form of
options. Indeed, in our sample, the annual average (over all of the firms in our sample) share of
stock owned by institutional investors has a correlation of 0.9 with the annualaverage share of
compensation paid in options.
In addition, we include two other variables that proxy for strongercorporate governance.
The first is the size of the board. Evidence suggests that boards with smaller numbers of
directors reduce the influence of the CEO and better represent shareholder interests (Yermack,
1995). Board size fell by approximately 15 percent between 1980 and 1994. The second
variable is the fraction of the firm's board members who are inside directors orgray directors
(non-insiders who have business dealings with the company). Firms with fewer outsiders are
less likely to act in the shareholders interests, and we would predict that they would be lesslikely
to have performance-based compensation for their CEOs. The average percentage of inside and
gray directors has decreased from about 45 percent in 1980 to about 35 percent in 1994.
Second, we allow for cross-sectional variation in corporate tax rates. Corporate marginal
tax rates vary because firms may be eligible for tax-loss-carrybacks and carryforwards,
investment tax credits, and the alternative minimum tax (see Auerbach, 1986; Auerbach and
Altshuler, 1.990; Auerbach and Poterba, 1987; Majd and Myers, 1987). Because these cross-
9. This variable is described in Gompers and Metrick (1998),
16sectional differences imply that different firmsshould respond differently to a givenchange in
tax rates, they potentially provide us witha way to isolate the tax effects. Firm-specific
corporate marginal tax rates are notoriously difficult to calculatefrom publicly-available data.
We use a trichotomous variable thatequals zero if the firm has tax loss-carry forwardsand
negative earnings in a given year, equals 0.5 times thestatutory corporate rate if the firm has
only one of those conditions, and equals thestatutory rate if the firm has neither loss
carryforwards nor negative earnings.'0
The cross-sectional variation in thecorporate tax rate may not be exogenous. Firms that
perform poorly could face low marginal tax rates andalso be particularly likely orunlikely to
provide performance-based pay. Because most ofour specifications use fixed effects, the
correlation we must be concerned about is betweenchanges in firm performance and changes in
compensation. We deal with this by controlling forlagged firm stock market performance inour
regressions. This should eliminate spurious correlationbetween tax rates and compensation that
is jointly caused by firm performance.
6.3Results
The dependent variable in ourregressions is the fraction of a CEO's total annual
compensation (measured as the B]ack-Scholes value of
stock options grants plus salary and
bonus) that comes from stock optionsgrants. We choose this reduced-form specification
because our interest is in thecomposition of CEO compensation. However, the factorsthat
affect the composition of compensationmight also affect the levels, and it will beimportant to
keep this in mind in interpreting our results.
Optimal contracting theory generally makespredictions about the incentives providedby
the total amount of firm stock and stockoptions owned by the CEO. We chose to model the
flow of option grants rather than the ultimateperformance sensitivity of the CEO'scompensation
and stock and stock option holdings becausewe have in mind an adjustment-cost model inwhich
it takes time for a CEO's holdings of stockand stock options to reach theoptimal level.'' In our
10 Graham (1996) presents evidence that the trichotomousvariable performs nearly as well as his recommended simulated marginal tax rate. Piesko (1999)comparesmarginal tax rates calculated from Compustat daLa withactual marginal tax rates from firm tax returns. He finds thatsimple binary variables are more reliablemeasures of the marginal tax rate than are either the Graham or trichotomousvariable. We obtain substantively similar resultswhen we switch from the trichotomous variable to the binary variablesrecommend by Plesko.
See Core and Guay (1999) for evidence that firmsadjust in this way.
17regressions, we include two measures of the currentperformance sensitivity of the CEO's wealth
to firm performance as explanatory variablesto reflect the distance of the CEO'scontract from
the optimal contract.
Table 3 presents results in which the tax effectsare identified solely by variation in tax
rates over time. The fraction of aimualcompensation paid in stock options is regressed on tax
variables, corporate governance variables,contract-theory variables, and variables reflecting
stock market returns. Both of theregressions in this table include firm fixed effects. Incolumn
I, the fraction in annual compensation paid in stockoptions is regressed on the log difference in
payoff (the combined payoff to both the firm and theCEO) from receiving compensation in
stock options rather than salary and bonus, wherethe payoff calculations are basedon statutory
marginal tax rates. This variable is defined as thelog difference between equation 3 andequation
6 in section 4. The coefficient on the taxvariable is large and statistically significantat the 95
percent level. The point estimate implies that a onepercent increase in the payoff difference
between stock options and salary and bonusresults in a 2.4 percentage point increase inthe share
of compensation paid in stock options.
The corporate governance variables all havethe predicted sign. Firms with ahigher
fraction of their shares owned by institutionalinvestors, use more performance_basedpay (stock
options). Firms with large corporate boards, ora large share of inside directors, are lesslikely to
use stock options.
The two contract theory variablesare the dollar change in CEO wealthper $1,000 change
in firm value (Jensen and Murphy,1990) and the dollar change in CEO wealthper 10 percent
change in firm value (Hall and Liebman, 1998). Asdiscussed in Baker and Hall (1998), these
two wealth sensitivity measures reflect two differentconcepts of how closely aligned the
manager's incentives are with the interests of the shareholders.In the regression they are meant
to measure how far the CEO's existing contract andownership of stock and stock options is from
the optimal level. The negative coefficientson the two variables suggests that firms thatare
below their optimal pay-to-performancesensitivity are more likely to give more stockoptions in
the current period.
The second column replaces the tax variablemotivated by deferral advantages with the
three statutory rates. Thecorporate after-tax share has a positive coefficient, aswe would
expect, because the tax advantage of stock options increasesas the corporate rate falls. The
18coefficient on the personal tax rate is small andnot statistically significant. The sign of the
coefficient on the capital gains rate is theopposite of that predicted by tax avoidancetheory.
Note that these results rely on time seriesvariation alone. This is not avery convincing
test. Since the log difference in payoffsmostly rises over the time period covered in oursample
as does the share of compensation paid in options, it ispossible that the tax variable is simply
reflecting other factors that were changing over this timeperiod that we have not included in our
regression. Therefore, it is important to look at specificationsthat rely on cross-sectional
variation in the tax variables.
Table 4 contains specifications that relyon cross-sectional variation in corporate tax
rates. The first column repeats the specification fromcolumn (I) of Table 3, but uses the
trichotomous measures of firmcorporate tax rates in place of the statutory rate incalculating
each firm's log difference in payoff frompaying compensation in options rather than insalary
and bonus. As in the previous table, we find thepositive coefficient on the log difference in
payoff, just as the theory suggest. However, the coefficientestimate is now much smaller,
suggesting that a one percent increase in the log difference inpayoff produces a one-tenth of a
percentage point increase in the share of compensation paid inoptions.
Introducing cross-sectional variation in the dependent variabledoes not eliminate the
potentially spurious correlation over time between the taxvariable and the share of compensation
paid in options. The second column of table 4 isolates thepooled cross-sectional variation in
corporate tax rates by adding time dummies and dropping the firmfixed effects. In this
specification, the coefficient on the tax variable isindistinguishable from zero. The coefficient
on the institutional variable continues to be large andstatistically significant. The third column
includes both firm fixed effects and time dummies,which tests for a relationship between with in-
firm changes in the dependent variable and within-firmchanges in each explanatory variable. In
this specification, the coefficient on the tax variableis again indistinguishable fromzero. The
coefficients on the corporate governance variablesare also statistically insignificant.
The third column contains a specification thattreats the Tax Reform Act of 1986
(TRA86) as a natural experiment. For firms and CEOsfacing the statutory corporate tax rate,
TRA86 increased the relative payoff topaying compensation in options by 1.7percent. For a
firm facing a zero marginal tax rate, it reduced therelative payoff by 4.5 percent. The reduction
occurred because TRA8G reduced the personal taxrate, making salary and bonus more attractive,
19while the decreased corporate rate hadno effect on zero-tax rate firms. Thus,we would expect
firms facing zero or low marginal taxrates to reduce their use of options afterTRA86, while
firms facing the statutory rate would beexpected to increase them, Few firms facezero marginal
tax rates year after year. Therefore, wetry to distinguish between firms that often face lowtax
rates and firms that nearly always face thestatutory rate. We define low tax firms as ones whose
average marginal tax rate over the 1984 to 1986 periodwas below 0.24.12Thenwe ran a
difference-in-differences regression to see ifhigh tax firms increased their use of optionsmore
than low tax firms. The interaction between
post TRA86 and high corporate tax rates is thekey
variable. The estimated coefficienton this variable is positive, but small and notstatistically
different from zero at the 95percentlevel.
It is important to note that in thisspecification as well, the main corporategovernance
variable, the share of the firm's shares owned
by institutional investors, performs astheory
would predict. The variableappears to be quite robust. Table 5 presents regressions of theshare
of compensation paid in stock optionson the fraction of the firm's shares ownedby institutional
investors. Since we have already established thatthese variables have astrong longitudinal
relationship, the regressions here are designed to focuson the cross-sectional relationship
between these two variables. The first andthird columns present regressionsusing data only
from 1994, and find a coefficient ofroughly 0.2 (column 1 contains no othercovariates, while
column 3 includes all of the othernon-tax covariates from the regressions in tables3 an 4).
Since the median share of a firm's stockowned by institutional investors inour sample rises
from 19 percent in 1980 to 49percent in 1994, this coefficient would imply that this factoralone
can explain 6 percentage points of the 23percentage point increase in the median share of
compensation paid in options that occurred over this timeperiod. Of course, this variable is only
one measure of the strengthening ofcorporate governance, so the total impact of improved
corporate governance could be greater. The second and fourthcolumns of the table use the
entire 1980-1994 sample, and include timedummies to isolate the cross-sectionalcorrelations.
Again, there is evidence of a strong cross-sectionalrelationship between the two variables,
although the coefficients are slightly smaller,perhaps reflecting a weaker corporategovernance
12 This cutoff was chosen after inspecting the distribution
of tax rates, and essentially separates firms thatare always at or near the statutoryratefrom ones that are sometimes below it.
20role in the earlier period. In sum, there is a strong relationship, in both longitudinal andcross-
sectional data, between the institutional investor variable and the optionspercentage variable.'3
7. The Million Dollar Rule
In 1993 section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code was enacted, limiting the
deductibility of executive compensation in excess of one million dollars, unless the
compensation was performance related. Proponents of this legislation argued that it would slow
the growth of executive pay and tighten the link between firm performance and executive
compensation.
The new provision became effective for tax year 1994 and applies to the CEO and the
other four most highly compensated executives in eachcompany. Pay that is performance
related such as stock-option grants and bonuses paid for meeting clear performancegoals, is not
affected by this regulation, provided that it has been approved by shareholders. Thus, the main
impact of the provision is to limit the deductibility of salary in excess of a million dollars.
Woodlock and Antenucci (1997) studied the proxy statements of 376 firms and documented that
most firms responded to the new law by qualifying top executivepay as performance related.
Perry and Zenner (1999) identified 25 firms that reduced salaries from above $1 million to below
$1 million and found that 23 of the firms cited section 162(m) as their reason fordoing so.
In this section of the paper we investigate whether this provision has affected the levelor
structure of executive pay, using the Execucomp data base, which contains informationon the
highest paid executives in each of the firms in the S&P 500; S&P Midcap 400 and S&P
SmallCap 600. Between 1993 and 1998 the median salary of the Execucomp executives rose
from $230,000 to $306,000. The median value of total compensation (salary, bonus, andoption
grants) rose from $470,000 to $882,000. Limiting the sample to CEOs indicates that the total
compensation of the median CEO rose from $1.1 million to $1.8 million over the period, while
the median salary rose from $441,000 to $550,000. Thus executive compensationclearly
continued to rise at a rapid rate after the implementation of the million dollar rule,though
perhaps at a slower rate than it otherwise would have.
13 The one specification in which the fraction owned by institutional investors is not significant is in column 2 of
table 4, a regression that includes both fixed effects and time effects.
21If the regulation affects behavior, itshould have the largest impacton firms whose
executives are receiving salaries thatare above the limit or just below it. Thus,we might expect
to see firms whose executives are
receiving relatively high salaries to rely moreheavily on
performance-based pay and less heavilyon salary in the years following theregulation. Perry
and Zenner (l999)ancl Livingston(1999) both find that this is the case. Thistrend can be clearly
identified in the Execucomp data set. Forexample, over the 1993 to 1998 period the median
annualized growth rate of salary for executiveswhose 1993 salary was below $500,000in the
previous year was 8.5 percent. For executives withsalary between $500,000 and $700,000 it
was 6.4 percent, for executives between $700,000and $850,000 it was 5.0percent, for
executives between $750,000 and $1 million itwas 3.1 percent, and for executives above $1
million it was 0.0 percent.'4
The observation that executives at lowerlevels of salary had highergrowth rates is not
very strong evidence of an impact of section 162(m),however, because it is possible that low-
salary executives would have had highergrowth rates even in the absence of theprovision. To
explore whether this is the case, we useExecucomp data from both before and after the law
change. Ideally, we wou]d want to have data frommany years before the change to examine
whether there is an underlyingpattern of faster salary growth for low-salaryexecutives.
Unfortunately, the Execucomp data begin in 1992and therefore provide us withonly the 1992-
1993 growth rate in compensation touse as a baseline)5
We run regressions pooling data from1992-1993 through 1997-1998 of theannual
percentage change in different forms of compensationon a variable, MILLION, that is designed
to measure the likelihood that an executive'scompensation will be affected by section l62(m).
We define MILLION as the minimum of!and of the executive's salary dividedby $1 million in
the previous year. Thus,any executive with salary at or above $! million wouldreceive a value
of 1, while an executive with asalary of $500,000 would be coded as a 0.5.16We include this
variable by itself and also interacted witha dummy variable (AFTER) thatequals 1 for years
1994 and after. Thus the MILLION variableis designed to pickup any underlying relationship
14 Of the 3137 executives for whom we havecomplete data between 1993 and 1998, 2708 had 1993salaries below $500,000,while only 35had1993 salaries above$1million.
15 The Hall-Liebman data set contains onlya combined salary and bonus variable, making itimpossible to use it to analyze this issue.
16 We also ran the regressions (not reported)allowing for a non-linear relationship between MILLIONand compensation growth and obtained substantively similar results.
22between the level of salary and thegrowth rate of salary, while the interactedone will identify
any differential growth rate of salary by income inthe period after sectionl62(m) took effect.
We also include a full set ofyear dummies, the natural logarithm of the firm'smarket value, and
the firm's annual rate of returnover the two previous years as controlvariables. To reduce the
sensitivity of our results to outliers, werun quantile regressions and robust regressionsl
Table 6 contains our results. The firstfour columns are for alltop executives, while the
last four columns focus on CEOs.Columns I and 2 present estimatesfrom robust regression for
the percentage change insalary and the percentage change in totalcompensation (salary, bonus,
stock grants, and stock optiongrants). In the salary growth regressions forall executives, the
coefficient on MILLION is negative and
significant, indicating that there isan underlying
relationship between the level of executivecompensation and its subsequent growthrate. The
coefficient on is negative as well,suggesting that the negative relationship
between the level of salary and itssubsequent growth rate intensifiedslightly after 1994. The
relatively small magnitude suggests thatan executive with a $1 million dollarsalary would see
his salary grow at an annual rate thatwould be about 0.6percent slower than an executive
earning $500,000.
In the second column the coefficienton MILLJON*yp isessentially zero, suggesting
that any decrease in salarybrought about by section 1 62(m)was offset by increases in bonus and
stock option grants. The resultsare similar for the medianregressions. There is some evidence
of a very small slowdown ingrowth of salary for executives likelyto be affected by section
l62(m), but no sign of a change in totalcompensation. Taken together, thisprovides evidence of
a very small substitution of "performancerelatedpay" for salary.
The last four columns run identicaltests but limit the sample to CEOs.The interaction of
MILLION*AFTER continues to be small andnegative in the salary regressions. Incontrast, the
impact of 162(m) on total compensationappears to be positive and fairly substantial(about 15
percentage points per year) in these regressions. Thatis, the increase in bonus and stockoptions
following the million dollar rule more than offsetthe very small decline insalary.
All of these conclusions should be
interpreted somewhat cautiously becauseour data provide
us with only one pre-1993 controlyear. Nevertheless, the data are consistent withsection
l62(m) having led to a very minor slow down insalary growth, and one that is dramatically
smaller than what one would concludewithout controlling forunderlying differential salary
23growth rates at different levels of salary. Since total compensation for CEOs did not decline, and
perhaps increased, there is evidence of a minor substitution of performance-relatedpay for salary
in response to the regulation.
8. Executive Compensation and The Elasticity of Taxable Income
Even if taxes have only a minor impact on executive compensation, the structure of
executive compensation is important for tax policy because high-incometaxpayers are sources of
significant revenue and are the focus of important debates about the efficiency cost of taxation.
Goolsbee (1999) has recently argued that executive decisions to exerciseoptions are
highly responsive to intertemporal differences in tax rates created by tax reforms. He claims that
much of the apparent decline in taxable income for high incometaxpayers between 1992 and
1993 documented by Feldstein and Feenberg (1996) can be explainedby executives shifting
option gains into 1992 in order to avoid the higher marginal tax rates that went into effect in
1993. By extension, he imp]ies that the high elasticities of taxable income withrespect to
personal tax rates estimated by comparing the pre- and post-tax reform taxable income of high
income individuals reflect intertemporal shifting of income and notpermanent effects of
taxation. If this is true, then the deadweight loss of taxation is lower, as is the cost of
progressivity.
While Goolsbee presents comprehensive evidence that option gainswere unusually high
in 1992, his identification of the impact of tax rates on the timing ofoption gains depends on
correctly specifying a counterfactual level of options that would have been exercised in the
absence of the tax change. He simply assumes a linear time trend. Thepurpose of Goolsbee's
time trend is presumably to account for the increasing use of options overtime.However, since
options typically require a vesting period of at least a couple of years, a much more direct
measure of expected option gains can be constructed, based on the total value of vested options
held by the CEO. Since options typically have vesting periods that exceed twoyears, this total
can be treated as exogenous, since it will not be affected by the tax changes.
More generally, the value of options held by the CEO is likely to have amajor effect on
his exercise decisions. If his options are out of themoney, he will not have gains to realize. If
there has been a recent run-up in the market, an optimizing CEOmay exercise an unusually large
24amount of options in order to diversify hisoverall portfolio, and ifin-the-money options are
about to expire, they will beexercised in the currentyear.
Our evidence suggests that muchof the apparent taxshifting can instead be attributed to
stock market performance and thetiming of past option grants. Usingour 15-year panel, we
replicate 000slbee's (1999) result for the 1993period, but show that the impact oftaxes is not
present in other time periods. Moreover,even the result for the 1993 perioddisappears when
appropriate controls for past optiongrants and stock price appreciationare included.
The top three rows of Table 7present data on the taxable incomes of CEOsin the Hall-
Liebrnan sample. For these resultsour panel has been narrowed to includeonly CEOs whose
firm's fiscal years correspond withtax years. In addition, wecreate a balanced panel for each of
the three tax-reform periodsby excluding any firm for which thereare not complete data for the
period surrounding the reform.
The fourth row of the table showsthat the 1993 tax act raised thetop marginal personal
income tax rate from 31.0 to 39.6percent effective for tax year 1993, witha further increase
occurring in 1994 due to the uncapping of theMedicare payroll tax. Thetop row of the table
shows that taxable incomewas higher in 1992 than forany other year in our sample (all dataare
in 1994 dollars). Optiongains were particularly high in 1992—more than double their 1991
level and 68 percent higher thantheir 1994 level. Thesepatterns are consistent with Goolsbee's
claim that taxpayers respondedto the anticipated increase inmarginal tax rates by shifting gains
into 1992.
The evidence from the othertwo tax reforms is less clear,suggesting that there might be
factors other than tax rates
determining the timing of option gains. ERTA1981 reduced the top
marginal tax rate from 70 percent in 1980to 50percentin 1982. However, there isno sign that
option gains were reduced in 1980 and 1981and then increased in 1982.'There was a big
increase in option gains in 1983however. Similarly, the highestyear of stock option gains in the
period around 1986 was 1987, astrange year to take gains sincetaxpayers would have known
that the personal rate would be 10percentage points lower if they waited until thefollowing
year.
18
17As we explained above, for executivescovered by the maximum tax on earnedincome, there was not a decline in tax rates between 1981 and 1982.
18 It is possible that the large stock marketdecline in October 1997may have prompted some people to exercise options earlier than they otherwise would have.However, an increase in option exercisestypically follow stock
25What all the peak years ofoption gains have in common is thatthey follow years of
strong stock market performance. The fifthrow of table 7 shows theaverage stock market return
during the previous year for the firms inour sample. The large value ofoption gains in 1983
followed a 35.5 percent increase inthe stock market. The 1992 boomin option gains followeda
46.6 percent increase in thdstockmarket; the more modest 1987peak in option gains followed a
19 percent gain (and a 43percent gain two years before)
Strong stock market performance raises thevalue of options available toexercise. The
sixth row of the table shows themean value of options held by CEO5at the beginning of the
year. All three of the peak years of option
gains correspond with peakyears in terms of the value
of options available for exercise.Since stock market appreciationduring the year also increases
the value of options available toexercise later in that year, we needto account for currentyear
stock market appreciation as well.
Table 8 contains Goolsbee-styleregressions for each of the tax reforms.The first two
columns reprint the results from Goolsbee(1999). The third and fourth columnreplicate his
results in our sample. In particular,with a specification similar tohis, we are able to replicate his
finding that the current after tax share hasa positive coefficient and thefollowing year's after-tax share has a coefficient ofroughly negative one. Columns (5)through (8) show that this pattern
was unique to the 1993 tax reform.Indeed, in the TRA86 regressions thecoefficient on the
following year's tax rate is positive andsignificant. Columns (9) and (10)pool all three reforms
and fail to replicate thepattern that would reflect intertemporalshifting. 19
It is possible that the ease withwhich one can shift thetiming of option gains is
asymmetric. It may be harder to shiftoption gains forward in time sincesome options expire and
therefore must be exercisednow. In addition, options were a muchsmaller portion of
compensation in the early 1980s, soperhaps the ERTA 81 results are notsurprising.
Nonetheless, these results cast doubton the proposition that this is the channelthrough which
spurious estimates of the elasticity of taxableincome have occurred forprevious tax reforms, and
they suggest that we should look harder foralternative explanations for thetiming of option
gains.
market increases, not declines.
19 The results also fail to suggest large
permanent effects of marginal tax rates on taxableincome.
26Table 9 attempts to predictoptions gains using the lagged andcurrent increase in a firm's
market value and the value of theoptions held by the CEO at the start of theyear. The two stock
market variables strongly predictoption gains, while the value of options held hasthe correct
sign in all of the specifications and issignificant in the pooled sample eventhough it is highly
correlated with the two stock marketreturn variables. In contrast, thetax-timing explanation
fails, even in thel993 period.
It is important to realize thatourresults do not invalidate 000lsbee'scritique of claims
that aggregate revenue data from 1992and 1993 prove that elasticities of taxableincome are
large. We have simply given an alternativeexplanation for why taxable incomeswere unusually
high in 1992. However, our results do castdoubt on the conclusion thatlarge timing shifts are
ubiquitous and capable of explainingaway the more careful estimates of taxable income
elasticities that have been performed
using micro data (e.g., Feldstein, 1995; Autenand Carroll,
1995).
One further point is in order. It issometimes argued that the combination ofincreased use
of options and the booming stock marketexplains why federal tax revenues have beenso much
higher than expected during the 1990s.However, while large option gains increaserevenue from
the personal income tax, theyproduce offsetting deductions forcorporations. The net impact on
revenue is only the difference in the twomarginal tax rates times the option gain. Whilethe gap
between the personal rate and the effectivecorporate rate is non-trivia], the impact of large
option exercises on total revenue issubstantially smaller than the amount by which theexercises
inflate personal tax revenue and reducecorporate tax revenue.
9. Conclusion
We have described the tax rules forexecutive pay in detail and analyzed howchanges in
various tax rates affect the taxadvantages of stock options relative tosalary and bonus. We find
that there is a moderate taxadvantage to options —currentlyabout $4 per $100 in pre-tax
executive pay —andthat changes in the tax advantage ofoptions over time have had at most a
modest impact on the composition of
pay. Corporate governance factors, particularly the roleof
large investors, appear to be more important inexplaining the dramatic increase in optionpay.
In addition, our evidencesuggests that more direct attempts to use taxpolicy to influence
executive compensation have had little effect.We find that the million dollar rule ledcompanies
27to substitute performancebedpay for salary. But our evidence suggests that thissubstitution
was quite modest, and there is no evidence that thetotal level of pay was reduced.Overall,
although the stock-option explosion hasdramatically increased the link betweenpay and
performance, this change is due almostentirely to nontax factors.
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30Table 1
Tax and Accounting Treatment of Executive Compensation:
Cash Payments versus Standard Executive Options.







Cash payments made to
CEO
Taxed as ordinary income.Fully deductible. Since
1993, any pay over $1
million is not deductible
unless it is performance
based.







Options grant the executive
the right, but not the
obligation, to buy shares of
stock at an exercise price
(typically the current stock
price at the date of grant).
The options typically vest
over a 3-5yearperiod. The
typical maturity is 10 years
but the manager may
exercise early. Some
options are discount options
(the exercise price is lower
than the stock price at the
grant date). Premium
options are the reverse (the
exercise price is greater
than the stock price at grant
date.
The granting of an option is
typically an untaxed event,
Upon exercise, option
profits are taxed at the
ordinary rate. If the
executive continues to hold
onto the shares, the
executive is taxed in the
usual way (at the capital-
gains rate) on any further
appreciation of the share
price,
A parallel tax deduction at
the corporate level is
generally allowed upon




therefore are not subject to
the $1-million cap.
There is no expense recognition (at
grant, exercise or sale) for options
if, as is usually the case, the
options are not discounted (in the
money at grant date) and the
exercise price and number of
options is known at grant date.
For discount options, the
difference between the stock price
and the market price is expensed
over the vesting period. For
options with variable terms (e.g. a
variable exercise price, vesting that
is tied to performance), the options
are marked to market and
expensed during the time between
grant and exercise.
Note: We thank compensation consultants Scott Greenberg and Scott Olsen (both of TowersPerrin) and Frederic Cook (of Frederic W. Cook and
Associates) for helpful conversations in understanding the tax and accounting rules.Table 2
Tax and Accounting Treatment of Executive Compensation:
Incentive Stock Options (ISOs), Restricted Stock, and Stock Appreciation Rights (SARs)






ISOs are identical to NQSOs
in their design. However, they
have an annual cap of
$100,000 (on the amount that
vests). The tax treatment of
ISOs also differs.
If the usual conditions are met,
there is no tax at grant or
exercise. At sale, all option
profits and subsequent capital
appreciation are taxed at the
capital-gains rate.
If the usual conditions are
met, there is generally no
corporate tax deduction at
grant, exercise or sale.
.
As with NQSOs, there is
generally no expense
recognition for ISOs (ever).
Restricted
Stock
Similar to stock options, but
shares (which vest slowly)
rather than options are granted
to the executive. Unlike
options, the shares typically
have voting and dividend
rights,
The individual is taxed at the
ordinary rate as the restrictions
lapse. However, the manager
may choose to be taxed at
grant date, in which case all
subsequent appreciation is
taxed at the capital gains rate.
Dividends are taxed at the
ordinary rate.
The company generally
receives a parallel deduction
equal to the amount of the
executive's income when the
executive is taxed.
Restricted stock is generally
subject to the million dollar
cap.
Restricted stock is generally
expensed over the vesting
period. The amount
expensed is the difference
between the current stock





Rights that replicate the profits
of stock options. Rarely used
since stock options have more
favorable accounting treatment
(and options provide the same
benefit of cashless exercise
through broker loans.)
Generally have the same tax
treatment as NQSOs.
Generally have the same tax
treatment as NQSOs
Unlike options, SARs are
marked to market each
period, and the difference
between the stock price and
the exercise price is
expensed over the
outstanding period of SARs.
Note: We thank compensation consultants Scott Greenberg and Scott Olsen (both of Towers Perrin) and Frederic Cook(of Frederic W. Cook and
Associates) for helpful conversations in understanding the tax and accounting rules.Table 3
Compensation Regressions that Relyon Variation in TaxRatesover Time
dentViblShf
(2)
LN difference in payoff 1 2.393 (0.349)
LN (i-statutory personalrate) -0.015(0.034) LN(i-statutory cap. gains, rate)
0.330 (0.171) LN (1-statutory corporaterate) 0.399 (0.148)
Corporate Governance Variables
Fraction of firm's shares owned
0.043 (.029) 0.052 (0.028) by institutional investors
Size of the firm's board of directors. -0.002 (.001) -0.003 (0.001) Fraction of directors who are insideor grey.-0.082 (.033) -0.092 (0.030)
Contract Theory Variables
ACEO W per $1,000A in FV 2 -0.26 1 (0.095) -0.247 (0.087) ACEOWper lO%SinFV3 -5.83 (1.89) -5.54 (2.01) Volatility4 5.21 (4.24) 2.61 (3.69) LN(Fjrm market value)
0.019 (0.006) 0.019 (0.006)
Stock Market Return variables
Lagged annual firm stock market return 0.006 (0.009) 0.003 (0.008) Lagged annual S&P500 return -0.035 (0.023) -0.029 (0.023)
Regression Diagnostics
Total sample size 5179 5179 Firms 427 427
I Log difference in payoff is the log differencein combined firm and CEO after-taxshare between paying compensation in options and paying salary.
2 This variable is the dollar change in CEOwealth per $1,000 dollar change infirmmarket value (see Jensen and Murphy, 1990).
3 This variable in the dollar charge in CEO
wealth per 10 percent change in firm value(see Hall and Liebman, 1998).
4 Standard deviation of firm market value intrillions.Table 4
Compensation Regressions that Relyon Cross-sectjon Variation inCorporate Tax Rates
ab le is Fra ction of M IC
(2) (3) (4)
LN difference in payoff
0.099 (0.041) -0.038 (0.036) -0.005 (0.044) Post T86
-0.005 (0.0 13) High Corporate T Rate
0.018 (0.017) Post TRA86* High Corporate Tax
0.024 (0.016) Rate
Corporate Governance Variables
Fraction of fi's shares owned o. 109 (0.027) 0.114(0.015) -0.009 (0.030) 0.087 (0.034) by institutional investors
Size of the firm's bod of directors.
-0.004 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.002 (0.001) 0.001 (0.002) Fraction of directors who are -0.124 (0.033) -0.003 (0.018) -0.041 (0.034) 0.001 (0.039) Inside, or grey.
Contract Theory Variables
ACEO W per $I,000A in FV2 -0.238 (0.094) -0.167 (0.053) -0.257 (0.096) -0.021 (0.147) CEO W per 10%A in FV3 -5.60 (1.78) -5.92 (1.05) -5.94 (1.96) -1.47 (0.486) Volatility4 2.48 (4.24) 1.62 (0.34) 1.12 (4.28) 1.06 (0.609) LN(Fj market value) 0.033 (.006) 0.008 (0.003) 0.009 (0.006) 0.012 (0.007)
Stock Market Return variables
Lagged annual firm stock market -0.002 (0.009) 0.011(0.010) 0.006 (0.009) -0.0 12 (0.013) Return
Lagged annual S&P500 return -0.056 (0.023) -0.053 (0.05 1) -0.039 (0.049) -0.154 (0.040)
Regression Diagnostics
Total sample size 5179 5179 5179 2534 fideffect
Yes Yes No
All three specifications use trichotomous
corporate tax rates. The sample in column 3 usesonly the years 1984 to 1988 since we are using 1986 as a natural experiment.
2 This variable is the dollar change in CEO
wealth per $1,000 dollar change in firmmarket value (See Jensen & Murphy, 1990). 3Thisvariable in the dollar charge in CEO wealth
per 10 percent change in firm value (See Hall andLiebman, 1998). 4 Standard deviation of firm market valuein trillions.Table 5
Large Institutional Investors and StockOption Compensation Thoss-5 ection a! Relation ship betw I
hependent variable is the share ofcompensation paid in options
(1) (2)
(3) (4)
Coefficient on fractionof firm's shares owned
by institutional investors
.217 (.067).145 (.014)




ContractTheory and Stock Market Covariates No No Yes YesTable 6
The Effect of the Million DollarRule on Salary and TotalCompensation
All To Executives
CEOs oni Robust Robust Quantile Quantije Robust Robust Quantije
I
Quantile regressionregressionRegressionRegression regressionregression RegressionRegression
%Ajn %Aintotal %Ain %Aintotaj%Ain %Aintotal %Ain %Aintotalcomp salary comp2 salary comp salary comp salary MILLION3 -0.060 -0.357 -0.063 -0.241 -0.087 -0.231 -0.103 -0.245 (0.005) (0.032) (0.006) (0.027) (0.0 10) (0.073) (0.011) (0.056)
MILLI0N* -0.011 0.026 -0.021 -0.015 -0.016 0.149 -0.034 0.158 AFTER4 (0.005) (0.033) (0.006) (0.029) (0.0 10) (0.076) (0.011) (0.057) N 35,950 35,950 35,950 35,950 7,571 7,589 7,57j 7,589 Standard errors in parentheses.Regressions also includeyear dummies, stock market return and thelog of market value.
2 Total compensation includessalary, bonus, restricted stock and stockoption grants. 3 MILLION is defined as the M1N
(1, salary in previous years divided by $imillion). 4 AER is an indicator variablcequal Inzcrobefore the regulation took placc andone af[er the regulation was in place (after1993).Table 7
Tax Reform, Stock Market Performance, and the Timing of Option Gains
ERTA8I TRA86 l993TaxAct
80 81 82 83 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
MeanCRO 0.874 0.8310.8720.990 1.1971.4481.6551.6321.656 2.0951.8752.6782.3241.964 Taxable Income
(million)
Mean CEO Salary 0.648 0.6720.6790.724 0.8370.9 17 0.959 1.0581.052 1.0281.0201.0701.2091.262 and Bonus
(millions)
Mean CEO Option 0.163 0.0980.0990.252 0.2400.345 0.5930.3900.414 0.6180.5471.2500.7430.378 Gains (millions)
Top Federal 70 69 50 50 50 50 38.5 28 28 28 31 31 39.642.5 Personal MTR




Mean value of .460 .706.686 1.166 1.1601.776 2.2292.3772.345 2.8802.6884.5524.2995.113 options held at
beginning of year
Valueof option .354 .139.144.216 .207.194.266 .164.176 .215 .203 .275 .173 .074
gainslValue of
options held
Sample size 279 279 279 279 295 295 295 295 295 272 272 272 272 272
SampleisHall-Lichman firms with December fiscal years who had complete data for one of the three tax reformperiods studied.Table 8
Attempts to Replicate the Tax-shifting Resultin Other Time Periods ThdentVan able is the Log of Tax able Income Gools beeGooslbee
Entire Entire Regression Regression 1993 1993 TRA 86TRAS6 ERTA 81 ERTA 81 1980- 1980-1994 (1) (2) Reform Reform (5) (6) (7) (8) 1994 (10)
0.026 -0.068 (0.134) (0.127) (0.537) (0.542) (0.210) (0.209)(0.090)(0.091) (.067) (0.065) Ln(l-tax(t÷l)) -0.867 -0.764 -1.214 -0.917 0.478 0.722 -0.103 0.043 0.176 0.183 (.118) (0.112) (0.491) (0.499) (0.157)(0.174) (0.072) (0.072)(0.068) (0.066)
Time .135 0.076 -.005 -0.364 0.04 1 0.008 0.094 0.035 0.056 0.027 (.008) (0.008) (.049) (0.049) (0.028) (0.028) (0.025) (0.026)(0.003) (0.003)
Ln (market 0.66 1 0.489 0.237 0.334 0.395 value) (0.015) (0.058) (0.039) (0.042) (0.017)
Years 1991- 1991- 1990- 1990- 1985- 1985- 1980- 1980- 1980- 1980- 1995 1995 1994 1994 1989 1989 1983 1983 1994 1994
Adjusted R2 0.72 0.77 0.61 0.63 0.69 0.76 0.80 0.81 0.63 0.68
notsi in the table.Standard
essionscontain fi
also contaIns errors in parentheses.Table 9
Alternative Explanations for theTiming of Option Exercises
The dependent variable is thelog of taxable income.
Endre 1993 Reform TRA86 ERTAS1 1980-1994
-oi oi (0.324) (0.136) (0.048) (0.057)
Ln(l-tax(t÷1)) -0.134 0.573 0.125 0.150 (0.33 6) (0.156) (0.053) (0.066)
Ln(marketvalue) 0.418 0.177 0.338 0.418 (0.061) (0.039) (0.046) (0.163)
Firm's stock market return(t) 0.298 0.268 0.2 14 0.258 (0.044) (0.045) (0.03 1) (0.023)
Firm's stock market return(t-l) 0.162 0.206 0.031 0.128 (0.041) (0.008) (0.029) (0.021)
Ln (value of options heldby CEO at start of 0.004 0.008 0.001 0.009 year)
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) Years
1990-1994 1985-1989 1980-1983 1980-1994 Adjusted R2 0.64 0.71 0.82 0.68 Observations















The analysis controls for the changing composition of firm size over time. Thus, these estimates show thepay to performance link for a
similarly sized company over time, in this case a company with a market value of $ I billion.
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Holds constant the personal rate at 40 percent and the
capital gains rate at 20 percent.
Holds constant corporate rate at4O percent and.capital
gains rate at 20 percent
Holds constant the personaland corporate tax rates,
each at4O percent




20 30 40 00 40 70 40 00
Top Co,ponI. Tn Rob
100
'0 20 20 40 50 00 70 00 00 100
Top P.,.ob.iI Too fbI.
40 00 00









Top Marginal Tax Rates Since 1980


















Tax Advantage of Options: 1980 to 1998
NPV of Tax Advantage of $100 in Options (NQSOs) Rather Than Cash
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Tax Advantage of NQSOs Relative to ISOs Over Time
NPV of Tax Advantage of $100 Payment to Executive: NQSOs minus SOs
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